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Abstract 
Several procedures were used to elicit direct numerical estimates 
of the probabilities associated with various events created by the 
conjunction of three independent subevents. However the question was 
asked, many respondents showed a misunderstanding of the conjunction 
rule. Less than one half met the minimal criterion of consistently 
assigning a probability to the conjunction that was no larger than that 
associated with the least likely constituent event. As a result, sub-
jects as a whole greatly overestimated the conjunctive probability. 
When attention was restricted to individuals who had followed the 
conjunction rule, a tendency remained to overestimate the smallest 
probabilities, relative to the calculated values. Subsidiary results 
concerned the effects on judgment of wishful thinking, the similarity of 
the constituent events, and the source of the constituent events. The 
implications of these results for eliciting and presenting the 
probabilities of unlikely events are also discussed. 
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Judging Unlikely Conjunctions 
A recurrent task in modern life is dealing with unlikely but conse-
quential sequences of events. These may be positive events, such as 
picking the winner of three successive horse races (on an Exacta ticket) 
or escaping all the radar traps while speeding down a 100-mile stretch 
of freeway. Or, they may be negative events, such as (a) being one of 
the unfortunate individuals who drink water contaminated by a toxic 
landfill, suffer an adverse reaction, and succumb to its effects, or (b) 
having a malfunctioning valve go undetected in a nuclear power plant, 
requiring it in an emergency situation, and having the backup valve be 
unavailable because of routine servicing. 
In order to make effective decisions regarding such contingencies, 
it is essential to assess and then appreciate the low probabilities 
associated with them. Even if one has a very good idea of what the 
payoff is for the Exacta or the suffering associated with a toxic reac-
tion, what one does about them may be very different if the chances of 
everything going right (or wrong) is 0.01, 0.0001, or 0.000001. Unfor-
tunately, people seem to have considerable difficulty judging such 
probabilities. Given the rarity of such events, the existence of diffi-
culties should not be entirely surprising. By definition, such events 
occur so infrequently that individuals have little direct, hands-on 
experience with them. For understanding, they must rely on observing 
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the experience of others or listening to the reports of experts. The 
former is likely to be unsystematic, the latter to be cotivated by 
concerns other than informing laypeople. Moreover, the probabilities of 
many unlikely events are hard to assess accurately even for experts who 
devote their lives to the task (Fischhoff, in press, and references 
therein). 
One judgmental difficulty that can be traced to the biased nature 
of lay experience is a tendency to exaggerate the likelihood of unlikely 
events (e.g., causes of death) that are disproportionately reported in 
the news media (Conbs & Slavic, 1979) or are unusually common in their 
personal lives (Lichtenstein, Slavic, Fischhoff, Layman & Combs, 1978). 
People seem not to realize (or at least they are unable to compensate 
for) the extent to which reporting and observation are driven by 
processes different than random sampling (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
A second problem is the tendency to overestimate the probability of 
unlikely events (Attneave, 1953; Hogarth, 1975; Lichtenstein et al., 
1978; Petrusic, Cousins & Corbin, 1984; Starr & Whipple, 1981). This 
bias could also be caused by undue salience of the rare occurrences of 
such events. Or, it could reflect difficulties with using any very 
small numbers (Poulton, 1968, 1977; Slavic & Lichtenstein, 1971), 
perhaps expressed in the assignnent of some too-high epsilon to any 
event deemed at all possible. 
A third threat to assessing the probabilities of unlikely conjunc-
tions is the possibili.ty that assessoents will be biased by the desires 
of the assessor, reflecting wishful thinking or its unnaued compler.:ient 
(Irwin, 1953; Langer, 1982; Weinstein, 1980; Zakay, 1983). 1 Although 
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any assessment could, in principle, be influenced by such biasing pro-
cesses, the ar.ibiguity and confusion surrounding unlikely conjunctions 
may render them particularly vulnerable to the intrusion of extraneous 
considerations. The magnitude of the consequences associated with those 
unlikely events that do attract attention nay create unusual needs to 
see things in a particular way. 
A final set of possible judgmental difficulties is unique to 
unlikely events that are seen as arising from the conjunction of a 
series of events. The foremost of these is that people frequently 
overestimate the probability of such compound events (Bar Hillel, 1973; 
Cohen, Chesnick & Haran, 1971; Slavic, 1969; Slavic, Fischhoff & 
Lichtenstein, 1976; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Such overestimation 
seems to reflect psychological processes such as the persuasiveness of 
coherent scenarios, the non-salience of the unlikely weak links in 
otherwise likely scenarios, insensitivity to the extent to which 
individually likely links can be cumulatively improbable, and anchoring 
of perceptions in the likelihood of initial probable events. For 
example, Slavic (1969) found that people were much less willing to play 
a gamble that paid them off if a single event with probability£ occur-
red than to play a gar1ble requiring the joint occurrence of four events 
with probability £(exp 1/4). 
An obvious strategy for dealing with the last of these worries is 
to avoid decor.iposition. Whenever possible, a single event should be 
considered, so that conjunctions never arise. Such a strategy could be 
pursued by individuals attempting to organi?.e their own thoughts or by 
communicators attempting to tell people about low probability events. 
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Thus, one talks about the Exacta or the loss-of-coolant accident, rather 
than the sequence of subevents leading to them. A drawback of this 
strategy is that it conflicts with an obvious strategy for dealing with 
the overall problem of the non-intuitive nature of low-probability 
events: avoid such events by replacing them with the conjunction of 
more Likely events ( for which people have more accurate perceptions). 
Determining the relative magnitudes of these competing threats to 
the understanding of low probability events is the primary goal of the 
present studies. The events to be judged (in all but one case) are 
variants on that depicted in Figure 1, showing three "spinners," each of 
which must end up in the black sector for the overall event to occur. 
In many respects, such spinners would seem to constitute very simple and 
understandable events. Until a consequential outcome (e.g., the payoff 
of a lottery) is associated with them, spinners are quite neutral, in 
the sense of not evoking any enotional responses or associations that 
might complicate the (cognitive) probability assessment process. Used 
i.ndividually, spinners are such a common and transparent data generator 
that they are used routinely in children's games and TV quiz shows. 
Decision analysts have sufficient confidence in people's ability to 
judge the size of spinner sectors that they use them to elicit their 
clients' probability assessments (Spetzler & Stagl von Holstein, 1975; 
Sta~l von Holstein & Matheson, 1979; Wallsten & Budescu, 1983). Indeed, 
they seem so straightforward that a recent survey sponsored by the 
EnvironTiental Protection Agency (Smith, Desvousges & Freeman, 1985) used 
the conjunction of two spinners, showing "risk of exposure" and "risk of 
death if exposed," to represent the overall "personal risk" . . ,: arising ..:rom 
ha?.ardous wastes. This particular procedure was derived with the ai.d of 
intensive "focus group" interviews in which laypeople expressed satis-
faction with this mode of presentation. 
Insert Figure l about here 
Thus, there are strong~ priori reasons and substantial anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that people understand the probabilities associated 
with single, and perhaps even nultiple, spinners. If this is the case, 
then displays such as Figure l might prove to be generally useful repre-
sentational devices, allowing the concretization of probabilities that 
are hard to understand in the abstract and too s1:1all to be shown on a 
single spinner. If this is not the case, then one might expect even 
more trouble with less schematic and well-defined events. Spinners seem 
i1mnune to raost of the threats to the comprehension of very small proba-
bil:i ties listed above. For example, there should be no problem of 
exposure to unrepresentative samples of information. However, the 
abstractness of the conjunction operation in this context may be diffi-
cult for subjects for whom that is not a well-developed concept. 
Empirical grounds for concern may be found in Bar-Hillel (1973), Cohen 
et al. (1971), and Slovic (1969), all of whora observed substantial 
overestimation of the probabilities associated with the conjunctions of 
. ·J 1 ' t· t 2 s1m1 .ar y scnema 1c evens. The present studies attempt to replicate 
and extend those results. 
Overview of Studies 
The basic study in the present series asks subjects to judge the 
probabilities associated with the joint occurrence of all three 
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spinners, such as those in Figure 1, landing in the black. Those 
assessments can then be compared with the probabilities computed from 
measurements of the sectors on the spinners. Although straightforward, 
this procedure might be questioned on a number of grounds. One is that 
subjects may understand the event intuitively, yet be unable to express 
their understanding in terms of nurierical probabilities, despite our 
efforts to clarify how to use that response mode for small 
probabilities. A second concern is that the events are so abstract as 
to evoke unreal or unrepresentative behavior. More consequential events 
might improve performance by i::1aking the task more meaningful--or degrade 
it by allowing the intrusion of extraneous, non-cognitive factors. A 
third, and related concern is that the test stimulus (Figure 1) may be a 
little too tidy. It would be an unusual real-life conjunction that 
involved three events of precisely equal magnitude. A fourth concern is 
that people may misperceive the si?.e of the black sector on the 
individual spinners, leading to misestimation of their conjunction even 
among individuals who do understand conjunctions. 
The first of these concerns, regarding people's ability to employ 
the response mode, is addressed within the basic study with 
supplementary response modes that offer subjects alternative ways to 
express their understanding. One of these asks for the probability that 
at least one of 12 three-spinner events will occur, which should evoke a 
much larger number than that required by the individual three-spinner 
events. A second asks for the number of three-spinner events that 
respondents would expect to occur were all 12 carried out, a response 
node that requires an integer response between O and 12. These respon-
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ses can be compared with the probabilities computed from the spinners 
themselves to provide additional perspectives on subjects' under-
standing. They can also be compared with values for these complex 
events that are computed from subjects' probability assessments for the 
individual events in order to examine the internal consistency of sub-
jects' judgments. 
Concern over the response mode is also addressed in a separate 
study which provides subjects with sets of three blank spinners (i.e, 
circles with dots in the middle) and asks them to color black sectors on 
them so as to create events with a particular target probabilities. In 
this format, subjects do not have to use numerical probabilities, only 
to comprehend them. In order to evoke some of these subjects' intuitive 
notions of how probability judgments may be biased, they were also asked 
to create events having the same target probability, but appearing to 
have particularly large or small conjoint probabilities. 
The second concern, the abstractness of the events, is addressed by 
the addition of a lottery group, which performs the sal:1.e task as the 
basic group but is asked to imagine winning $100 if all three spinners 
in a set ended up in the black. If this hypothetical concreti:,:ation has 
any effect, it should be to make the event more meaningful. Should that 
happen, then the danger would arise of it becoming too meaningful, 
evoking an involvement in the event capable of distorting perceptions of 
its likelihood (e.g., wishful thinking). Thus, this manipulation eight 
affect the overall level of probability assessments, as well as their 
accuracy. Subjects were also asked to estimate how much they would pay 
to play each lottery. In addition to reinforcing the notion that the 
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spinners represent a lottery, this question provides an additional 
response mode for eliciting perceptions of probabilities without 
requiring the use of very small numbers. 
In the lottery condition, the event was described as involving 
simultaneous play of the three spinners. In the sequential lottery 
condition, the spinners were described as being played one at a time, 
with the play continuing only if each ends up in the black. Although 
both descriptions lead to the same probability for the conjunction of 
three "blacks," each might lead to a different mental representation of 
the events. For exaI:1ple, the sequential version r.1ay focus attention on 
the initial spinners, anchoring the overall probability assessments on 
them. The result may be higher probability assessments if the initial 
spinner is the most likely in the set, and lower assessments if it is 
the least likely (Ronen, 1973). The two representations may also regis-
ter somewhat differently on the cognitive processes dealing with con-
junctions. Perhaps the sequential version will highlight the need for 
each of the events to occur (or else one doesn't even get to try the 
next one); perhaps the trail through its successful events will create a 
coherent story which tends to obscure the alternative (Peterson, 1973; 
Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1976; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
The multiple events condition elicited probability assessments for 
the conjunction of three events described solely by their numerical 
probability of occurrence. Given the possible advantages of the spinner 
representations and people's apparent difficulty with numerical proba-
bilities, this context might be expected to produce the worst 
performance of all. However, it is worth including as a baseline 
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against which the hoped-for benefits of the spinners can be compared, 
and as an alternative method should estimating the size of the black 
sector on the spinners prove problematic (the fourth concern in the list 
given earlier). 
Within each condition, several different representations of each 
compound probability were given. They were created by systematically 
varying the variance of the black sectors on the spinners, from a tidy 
equal-probability version (like that in Figure 1) to a version with 
striking differences. Increasing the variance produces a set of spin-
ners having more black area and a most-likely event with a larger proba-
bility, both changes that might increase the apparent likelihood of the 
conjunction. It also produces a smaller least-likely event, that might 
decrease the perceived likelihood of the conjunction. There appear to 
be no studies on the decomposition of probabilities which could provide 
an empirical basis for choosing between these predictions. In each 
case, the least likely event in each set was always presented first. If 
the tendency for overall assessments to anchor on initial events (Ronen, 
1973) is repeated here, then greater variance will mean reduced per-
ceived probability. 
As a supplement to these studies using artificial events, a pair of 
conditions was created describing the spinners as representing the risks 
associated with leakage from a hazardous waste landfill (following Smith 
et al., 1985). The first spinner describes the risk of leakage, the 
second the risk of exposure to leaked chemicals, and the third the risk 
of illness from exposure. Thus, the context concretized the compound 
event as a series of sequential events. In the general risk condition, 
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subjects were asked to consider the risks posed by the landfill to some 
other individual; in the personal risk condition, they themselves were 
to be exposed. The contrast between these conditions offered another 
opportunity to look at the possible effects of wishful thinking on 
probability assess1;1ents. 
A final condition required subjects first to produce constituent 
events entirely from their own experience, such as "an international 
event that has a 75% chance of occurring." Their conjunctions then 
involved the co-occurrence of three such events, drawn from different 
areas of life (e.g., an international events, a sports event, a meteoro-
logical event). Although the previous contexts have all concerned 
events that do occur in life (ha?.ardous wastes, gambles), conceivably 
subjects might have a better "feel" for events that they themselves 
produce. Moreover their juxtaposition in a compound event should seem 
truly coincidental, thereby overcoming any possible tendency for sub-




Four decompositions were used to achieve each of three target 
probabilities. The two probabilities were: 0.002, 0.016, and 0.125. 
The decompositions were derived by taking the following factors of the 
target probability,£: (A) p(exp 1/3), p(exp 1/3), p(exp 1/3); (B) 
p(exp 1/2), p(exp 1/4), p(exp 1/4); (C) p(exp 1/2), p(exp 1/3), p(exp 
1/6); (D) p(exp 2/3), p(exp 1/4), p(exp 1/12). Table 1 shows the 
resulting probabilities, along with their sun (which reflects the total 
1.0 
area of the black sectors and which can be seen to increase with the 
variance in the decomposition). A single randomly chosen order was used 
for presenting the sets in all conditions. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Instructions 
Spinners 
Multiple spinners. To introduce them to the task, subjects in the 
basic condition were shown three spinners, presenting probabilities of 
0.595, 0.354, and 0.707 (and a joint probability of 0.149). They were 
told: 
Here is a set of three spinners. Imagine that all three were 
spun simultaneously. What is the probability that the arrows on all 
three would end up in the dark area? Please answer as carefully as 
you can. Do not hesitate to give fractional estimates (e.g., 0.785, 
0.006, 0.076). For example, 0.785 would mean that there is a 78.5% 
chance of all three spinners ending up in the black. An estimate of 
0.006 would correspond to a 0.6% chance, or 6 chances in 1,000, 
meaning that if the three spinners were spun 1,000 times, all three 
would end up in the black on 6 occasions. Answering 0.076 neans 
that you think that all three will end up in the black 76 times out 
of 1,000, or 7.6% of the time. 
Each of the 12 three-spinner sets of test stimuli were introduced 
by, "Now consider this set of spinners:" and fol lowed by, "What is the 
probability that the arrows on all three would end up in the dark area?" 
The lottery condition varied these instructions by changing the two 
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initial sentences to read, ''Imagine a lottery using these three spin-
ners. If the arrow ends up in the dark portions of all three spinners, 
you win $100." Immediately before the answer blank, they were asked 
"What is the probability that you would win?" After assessing the 
probability, they were asked, "How much would you be willing to pay to 
play such a lottery?" Their test stimuli were introduced with "Now 
consider the following lottery" and followed by, "If the arrow ends up 
in the dark portions of all three spinners, you win $100. What is the 
probability that you would win? 
ling to pay to play such a lottery? 
How much would you be wil-
For subjects in the sequential lottery condition, the second 
sentence of the lottery instructions was replaced by the following: 
First, Spinner A is spun. If the arrow ends up in the dark 
area, then Spinner Bis spun. If not, then the lottery is over. If 
the arrow on B also ends up in the dark area, then Spinner C is 
spun. If not, then the lottery is over. If the arrow on Spinner C 
as well ends up in the dark area, then you will win $100. 
The remainder of their questtonnaire was the sane except that each test 
stimulus was introduced by "Now consider the following lottery, which 
would be played in the sam.e way, beginning with A and then going on with 
Band then C (if possible)." 
For the multiple events group, the initial two sentences and 
example stimulus were replaced by: 
Imagine three events. 
Event A has a 60% chance of occurring. 
Event B has a 35% chance of occurring. 
Event C has a 71% chance of occurring. 
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What is the probability that all three of these events will occur? 
Their probability question was phrased as, "The probability of A and B 
and C occurring is 
Compound predictions. After assessing the probability for the 12 
sets, subjects in the basic form were told, "Look back now over all 12 
sets of spinners. If all 12 were spun, how many would expect to end up 
with all three arrows in the dark area?" The nunbers from Oto 12 were 
listed in a row with the instruction to "Please circle your answer." 
They were also asked, "If all 12 sets were spun, what is the probability 
that at least one would end up with all three arrows in the dark area?" 
Appropriate adaptations were made for the other three groups. 
Single Spinners. Subjects in the three spinners groups were then 
shown 12 single spinners, representing all those used at least once in 
the 12 three-spinner sets, as well as the three conjoint probabilities 
for those sets (i.e., 0.125, 0.016, 0.002). The basic group was told: 
Here are 12 additional spinners, not in sets. For each, 
estimate the probability that the arrow would end up in the dark 
area if it were spun separately. Again, please answer as carefully 
as possible and do not hesitate to use fractional estimates. 
Their question was "The pr 1)bability of the arrow ending up in the 
dark area is The two lottery groups received similar 
instructions, except that the second sentence was replaced by "Imagine 
that each represents a lottery, whereby you win $100 if the arrow for 
that spinner ends up in the dark area. For each, estimate the probabi-
lity that you would win." Their question was, "What is the probability 
that you would win?" They were also asked, "How r:iuch would you be 
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willing to pay to play such a lottery?" 
After the 12 spinners, subjects in the basic condition were asked, 
"If all 12 of these individual spinners were spun simultaneously, how 
many would you expect to end up in the dark areas?", followed by the 
nur::ibers from Oto 12, and "What is the probability that at least one 
will end up in the dark area?" Comparable questions with appropriate 
wording changes were given to the two lottery groups. 
Although the notion of a lottery was not mentioned to either the 
basic group or the multiple events group at the time they were making 
probability assessments, the final questions in their forms told them to 
go back to the three-event sets and "Imagine that each is now a lottery 
and you will win $100 if al1:_ three spinners end up in the black" (or "if 
all three events occur"--for the multiple events group). They were then 
asked, "How much would you be willing to pay to play Set X? $ ------
Creating Lotteries 
Subjects here were told, 
Imagine that you are designing a lottery. The way that 
participants play is by simultaneously spinning three spinners like 
these [the introductory examples used elsewhere]. If the arrows on 
all three spinners end up in the black area, then the participants 
win. You can make the size of the dark area in each spinner as 
large or as small as you wish. All three could have the same 
shape, or all three could have different shapes. 
The first exercise provided three 3.8 cm (1.5 in) circles with a 
black dot in the middle. They were told, 
Please color in these three spinners so that participants would 
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have a 25% chance of winning a lottery. That is, there should be a 
25% chance of all three arrows landing in the black area. You nay 
find yourself changing your mind while creating the spinners. If 
so, please make it clear which shapes you have settled upon. 
Subsequent questions asked for probabilities of 12.5%, 4.2%, 1.5%, and 
0.2% (which was also stated as "2 chances in 1,000"). 
Finally, they were told, 
While creating these five sets of spinners, you may have noticed 
that there were several different ways of creating a lottery with 
each chance of winning. Perhaps it occurred to you that some 
versions would seem more attractive to potential participants than 
others. That is, although different versions might have the same 
objective probability of producing a win, some might seem more 
likely to produce a win. Could you now repeat the preceding task, 
producing what you believe to be the most attractive lottery for 
producing each probability of winning. 
Five tasks analogous to the proceeding ones followed. 
Ha:;,:ardous wastes 
The substantive context of these questionnaires was patterned after 
that used by Smith et al., (1985) in their attempts to determine the 
benefits that people attribute to controlling the risks of hazardous 
waste sites. They described those risks in terms of the conjunction of 
two spinners, one giving ''risk of exposure" (also labeled "possible 
pathways") and one giving "risk of death if exposed" (also labeled 
"heredity and health"). A third spinner gave the conjunction of the 
two, called "combined risk: exposure and death" (also labeled "personal 
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risk"). Beneath each spinner, the associated probability appeared in 
both ratio and percentage form. In order to be able to test subjects' 
judgments, these probabilities were deleted. In order to preserve 
comparability with the preceding experiments, a three-event partition 
was used, the first two of which repre~ented the decomposition of Smith 
et al.'s first event into two independent constituent events. 
The personal risks form of this questionnaire read: 
Recently, the news media have given a good deal of coverage 
to the health risks posed by the leakage of hazardous chemicals 
from landfills. For the threat that one of these facilities posed 
to you to be realized, a number of things would have to happen: 
First, the chemicals would have to leak. Then, you would have to 
be exposed to them (e.g., by drinking groundwater that they have 
contar.1inated). Finally, you would have to become ill as a result 
of the exposure. That is, each of three uncertain events would 
have to happen. 
One way of thinking about such uncertain events would be in 
terms of a set of spinners, like the following. The chances of the 
landfill leaking toxic chemicals would be like spinning the first 
spinner and having its arrow end up in the dark area. The chances 
of your being exposed to those chemicals would be like spinning the 
second spinner and having its arrow end up in the dark area. The 
chances of your becoming ill as the result of that exposure would 
be like spinning the third spinner and having its arrow end up in 
the dark area. 
They were then shown the test three-event stir.mlus and asked, "If 
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these risks described a situation near you, what would you estimate to 
be the probability that all three of these events would happen." The 
use of the probability scale was then described and followed by "The 
probability of all three events occurring (and your becoming ill) 
is: The remaining questions were adapted appropriately. The 
general risks form described these risks as applying to ''an individual." 
Mixed Events ------
On the first page of this questionnaire, subjects were told, 
For each of the following questions, please describe an event that 
fits the accompanying description. By "event," we mean things 
such as, "I will have no cavities during my next dental exar.1. "It 
will rain in Eugene at least once during this coming April." 
"Margaret Thatcher will be Prime Minister after the next 
Parlimentary elections in Britain." or "The Ducks will be next 
year's PAC-10 football champions." 
The five events were specified as: (A) "an international event 
that has a 75% chance of occurring;" (B) "a personal event that has a 
10% chance of occurring;" (C) "a meteorological event that has a 5% 
chance of occurring;" (D) "a political event on the national level that 
has a 25% chance of occurring;" (E) "an event from the world of enter-
tainment that has a 35% chance of occurring." After events B-E, they 
were told to "make this an event that is unrelated to the previous 
one(s)." 
The nuneri.cal values of these probabilities were adapted from the 
single-event probabilities used with the middle-variance stimuli, after 
rounding them off to more customary values. Their order of presentation 
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followed that used in evaluation of individual spinners. 
For each event in the conjunction-estimation portion of the task, 
subjects were asked to describe briefly three of the simple events 
(e.g., B, D and E) and then to assess the probability that all _three 
would occur. The first conjunction involved events B, E, and D; its 
probability was 0.013, compared with 0.016 prior to the rounding. The 
second conjunction in valved B, C, and F, with probability 0.0018 (com-
pared with 0.0020). The third involved A, D, and F, equal to 0.131 
(compared with 0.125). The fourth involved A, C, and F, equal to 0.013 
(compared with 0.016). 
Subjects and Administration 
Subjects were recruited through advertisements in the University of 
Oregon student paper requesting paid volunteers for "experiments in 
judgment and decision making." They received $5 for participating in 1 
1/4 hours of unrelated tasks of which this was one. They were divided 
roughly equally between men and women, with the mean age of the former 
24 and of the latter 21. On previous occasions in which more detailed 
demographic information was obtained, subjects recruited in this way 
have been found to be roughly two-thirds students and one-third other-
wise associated with the university community (e.g., spouses, staff, 
hangers-on). Almost all have some university education, with the median 
being 15 years of schooling. 
Questionnaires were completed in self-paced groups of approximately 
SO. The different spinner multiple events conditions were alternated in 
packets given to subjects in early to mid-1984. Because of a collating 
error, somewhat fewer copies of the multiple-events questionnaire were 
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distributed. The two hazardous-events forms were alternated and distri-
buted in the sar.:1.e manner in 1985. The mixed-event forms were given to a 
subset of these subjects later in the sane session to allow assessment 
of within-subject consistency in response patterns. 
Results and Discussion 
Spinners 
Coherence 
Results. The probability of the conjunction of a series of events 
can be no larger than the probability of the least likely of those 
events, considered singly. Any case in which subjects' responses failed 
to maintain this relationship was interpreted as a violation of coher-
ence.3 Table 2 shows the distributions of such violations across the 
four groups. Perhaps the most striking feature of these results is the 
small percentage of subjects who consistently passed this rather lenient 
coherence criterion. Over all groups, only 22.3% of subjects gave 
conjoint probabilities no greater than the smallest single-event proba-
bility for all 12 stimulus sets. About half that percentage of subjects 
always violated the rule. Indeed, the table reveals a curvilinear 
relationship, with most subjects consistently either obeying or viola-
ting the rule for most of the stimuli. Categorizing subjects as coher-
~nt if they had two or fewer violations (out of 12 possible) and as 
noncoherent if they had ten or more yields 45.2% coherent and 26.7% 
noncoherent subjects. Only 28.1% of subjects showed one of the seven 
(of 12 possible) intermediate degrees of coherence. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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Although it is never very large, the degree of coherence seems to 
vary across questionnaires. The percentage of coherent subjects varies 
from the lottery group's 35.8% to the basic group's 54.8%, with the 
sequential lottery (44.4%) and multiple events (44.1%) groups in be-
tween. The percentage of noncoherent subjects ranges from the basic 
group's 12.9% to the nultiple event's group's 44.1+%, with the sequential 
lottery (20. 3%) and lottery (37. 7%) groups in between. The differences 
in the distributions of coherent subjects across groups is statistically 
significant (chi-squared= 19.63; df = 6; p < .005). 
Discussion. By and large, these subjects have demonstrated a 
distressingly low level of understanding of one of the basic laws of 
probability theory. Even by our rather lenient categorization scheme, 
less than half of the subjects produced generally coherent responses. 
Although this result is consistent with the lack of understanding ob-
served in previous studies, it is reasonable to ask whether it was 
somehow induced by the details of the present methodology. It is my 
reading of the questionnaires that they ask the probability assessment 
question in four different ways, each of which seems fairly reasonable 
and straightforward, not unlike questions that might arise in everyday 
li.fe. For what it is worth, they were not designed with the intent of 
demonstrating noncoherence and this high level cane as quite a surprise 
(and substantially complicated the data analysis). 
The best performance was found in the basic group, which might be 
seen as having a relatively abstract setting compared to the lottery 
groups. With the lottery format, somewhat better performance was ob-
served when the event was described as happening sequentially, although 
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differing by a factor of five (0.068 vs 0.342). 
Inserts Tables 3a, 3b, and 3c about here 
One pattern emerging in all three tables is that the different 
conditions had no consistent effects on estimates. Three-way ANOVAs 
(Form X Probability X Decomposition) yielded non-significant (p > .20) 
F-ratios for the Form factor in each case. Thus, there was no evidence 
of a wishful thinking effect increasing (or its complement decreasing) 
the probabilities associated with the lottery versions; nor was there 
any significant overall difference between the probabilities evoked by 
nunerical and pictorial stimuli. This was true both with the (seemingly 
more sophisticated) coherent subjects and the noncoherent subjects, as 
well as the conditions as a whole. 
Not surprisingly, there was a highly significant (p < .0001) Proba-
bility effect in all three tables. Nonetheless, the differences between 
the assessments evoked by stimuli associated with the different target 
probabilities were much smaller than they should have been. The best 
aggregate performance is found with the coherent subjects. However, 
even there, the 0.125 stimuli evoked mean responses only ten times (in-
stead of 60 times) larger than the 0.002 stimuli. Moreover, the 
assessed probabilities were quite different from the target probabili-
ties, especially for the saaller values which were the focal topic of 
this investigation. The mean probability assigned to the 0.002 conjunc-
tion was at least five times that value, and was much higher for the 
4 noncoherent subjects and the pooled results. 
There was a strong Decomposition effect within the coherent sub-
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jects group (F = 15.35; df = 3,261; p < .0001), 5 reflecting the tendency 
for assessments to increase as the variance of the decomposition de-
creased. Overall, the no-variance decomposition (A) evoked probabili-
ties that were twice as large as the high-variance decomposition. Ap-
parently, subjects were more attuned to the fact that the high variance 
decomposition included one very small probability than that the no 
variance aecomposition offered no very large probability and the small-
est sum of probabilities (and total area, with the spinners). 
This pattern was tempered by a modest interaction with Form 
(F = 2.68; df = 9,261; p < .01) for the coherent subjects. The most 
discrepant form was the multiple events, in which the four decomposi-
tions produced similar mean probabilities. Thus, whatever aspects of 
spinners led to the (normatively inappropriate) decomposition effect 
observed in the other groups, was not evoked by the numerical represen-
tation of this group. 6 
Discussion. The pooled results reveal a rather dismal picture. 
All probability assessments are too high and too much alike, given the 
different target probabilities. Much of this poor performance is, of 
course, attributable to the noncoherent group, where matters are on the 
average much worse. Although the coherent group's performance is deci-
dedly better, it, too, has trouble with the smaller probabilities. 
Moreover, these subjects alone were sensitive to the (normatively irre-
levant) way in which the target probabilities were decomposed. 
Thus, the probabilities of unlikely conjunctions were consistently 
misassessed with four different, reasonably straightforward presenta-
tions, designed, in part, to facilitate understanding. It did not help 
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to use a graphic representation instead of a numerical one, to make the 
conjunctive event a lottery instead of a consequence-less event, or to 
describe the lottery as happening sequentially instead of simulta-
neously. Even though performance was much better auong subjects who 
consistently followed the conjunction rule, the fact remains that they 
were but a minority of all subjects. The pooled responses might be 
interpreted as the perceptions that would be evoked by presenting such 
stimuli to individuals from this population, without any additional 
explanation. The responses of the coherent subjects might represent the 
level of understanding that could be achieved with tutoring in the basic 
rules of conjunction. 
Compound Multiple Events 
Results. After judging the 12 three-event sets individually, sub-
jects considered two aspects of what would happen were all the events to 
be played: (a) the number that they would win (in terms of the lottery 
instructions) and (b) the probability that they would win at least one. 
Formally,!: should be equal to the sum of the probabilities of the 
individual events and b should be equal to one minus the product of one 
minus each of the event probabilities. Based on the objective probabi-
lities, the former is equal to 0.572 and the latter is equal to 0.455. 
Of course, to the extent that subjects do understand how the probabili-
ties of the individual stimuli compound, their personal computations 
would presumably be based on their own estimates of the individual 
stimulus probabilities, rather the calculated values. Because they over-
estimated those values, subjects should expect to win more than one half a 
lottery and to have more than a 0.45 5 chance of winning at least one. 
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Table 4 presents subjects' estimates of these quantities, along 
with the values computed from their responses to the individual stimuli. 
The number that subjects expect to win is in all cases nuch higher than 
the expectation computed froo either the objective probabilities of the 
individual stimuli or from their subjective probabilities. The higher 
individual probabilities assigned by the noncoherent subjects are 
reflected in their higher expected number of wins, although the differ-
ence is much less than one would expect. In fact, the noncoherent 
subjects' win estimate is not inconsistent with that calculated from 
their individual event estimates. By contrast, the coherent subjects' 
estimates are too high by a factor of three, meaning that the small 
probabilities of the individual events mount up too fast. 7 
Insert Table 4 about here 
The exaggerated probabilities of "success" on the left-hand side of 
Table 4 are replaced by underestimated probabilities on the right-hand 
side. All groups thought that winning at least one event was less 
likely than they should have, given their individual event probabili-
ties. Thus, they did not see quite how likely it was that not all of a 
series of unlikely events would fail to occur. The discrepancies were 
particularly great for the noncoherent subjects, for whom at least one 
success should have been a virtual certainty. 
Within each group, subjects who generally assigned higher probabi-
lities to individual events tended to expect a higher number of wins. 
For all subjects, these correlations were 0.534, 0.579, 0.372, and 
0.402, for basic, lottery, sequential lottery, and multiple events, 
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ners (comprising the spinners that had appeared in the multiple-event 
stimuli as well as ones representing the three target probabilities). 
For only four of these 36 comparisons were there significant differences 
(alpha .OS) between the estimates of coherent and noncoherent sub-
jects. As a result, the higher multiple-event estimates of the nonco-
herent subjects cannot be attributed simply to their having exaggerated 
the single-event probabilities. Subjects in the lottery and sequential 
lottery groups also estimated the amount that they would pay to play 
each of these single-event lotteries. Here, too, there were few signi-
ficant differences (three in 24 cases) between coherent and noncoherent 
subjects, providing evidence that they saw the single events similarly. 
Table 6 presents the raean responses of subjects in these groups. 
The probability assessments are strikingly similar to one another. 
There was, therefore, no tendency for the lottery context to induce 
wishful thinking or its opposite. Given the relative lack of ambiguity 
in the probabilities of these events, they should have provided much 
less opportunity than the multiple-stimulus events for subjects' percep-
tions to be influenced by such motivational factors. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
The probability responses in Table 6 are also fairly similar to the 
measured probabilities for the spinners, with the only systematic devia-
tion beiag a tendency to overestimate the smallest probabilities. Com-
pared with the responses in Table 3, these assessnents are smnewhat more 
accurate than those evoked by the 1:mltiple-stimulus events from the coherent 
subjects and much better than those evoked from the noncoherent subjects. 
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respectively (p < .05, in each case). These correlations were consi-
derably weaker within the coherent and noncoherent subgroups, suggesting 
that the overall correlation reflected primarily the tendency for nonco-
herent subjects to provide higher estimates of both types. 8 There was 
also a tendency for subjects who gave high individual probabilities to 
assign a high probability to having at least one success, with correla-
tions of 0.321, 0.350, 0.385, and 0.407, for the groups in the order 
listed above. This, too, seemed largely attributable to the overall 
differences between the coherent and noncoherent subjects. 9 
Discussion. Given the difficulty of the mental arithmetic required 
by these tasks, the responses that they evoked should only be evaluated 
qualitatively for the understanding that they reveal. In this light, 
they show some rough kinds of consistency, in that subjects assigning 
higher probabilities to the individual stimuli tended to expect more 
successful events and a greater chance of at least one success. In 
other respects, however, there are substantial discrepancies between 
subjects' estimates for these compound events and those computed either 
from the objective probabilities or their subjective probabilities for 
the individual events. 
Willingness _to R_ay 
Results. Table 5 shows the mean amount that subjects were willing 
~ t l ' f ' 12 l · t 10 LO pay op ay eacn o. tne t1ree-sp1nner evens. On the average, 
noncoherent subjects were willing to pay about twice as much as coherent 
subjects, although few of the differences for individual estimates were 
statistically significant (alpha= .05). Although the direction of this 
difference is consistent with noncoherent subjects' higher probability 
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the result was only marginally significant statistically (chi-squared= 
4.18; df = 2; p < .20). The multiple events condition might be thought 
of as the most difficult, because it was the most abstract, or as the 
easiest, because it gave the probabilities nunerically and with the 
least extraneous detail. Subjects knowing the conjunction rule (and its 
application in this case) would have a clear upper limit on their 
responses. It produced the most clearly differentiated performance, 
with 16 coherent subjects, 16 noncoherent subjects, and only 4 in the 
middle. Perhaps those who understood the rule at all understood it best 
here. 
It follows from our definition of coherence, that the less coherent 
subjects will tend to give higher probabilities. As a result, varia-
tions in the responses across the different conditions can be predicted, 
in part, by the proportions of coherent subjects in each. Therefore, 
the results that follow are reported not only for the conditions as a 
whole, but separately for the coherent and noncoherent subjects within 
them. Comparisons within those subpopulations will render cross-condi-
tion analyses 80re meaningful, as well as create a profile of these two, 
possibly distinct subjective approaches to probability. 
Multiple Event Probabilities 
Results. Table 3a shows the mean probabilities assigned by all 
subjects in the four conditions to the 12 three-event stimuli, organized 
by target probability and decomposition. Tables 3b and 3c show the 
subsets of those responses produced by consistently coherent and nonco-
herent subjects. By definition, the noncoherent subjects produced much 
higher assessments than did the coherent ones, with the overall mean 
21 
assessments, its magnitude is not commensurate with how much higher 
their probabilities were. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
In every case, the mean response of Multiple Events subjects was 
higher than those for the two lottery groups (which were quite similar). 
Given the similar probability assessments of these groups, it appears as 
though the experience of thinking about the events initially as lotter-
ies somehow makes (lottery) subjects more risk averse. Perhaps it makes 
them more sensitive to budgetary constraints or less sanguine about the 
chances of winning (even if they do assign similar probabilities). 
In general, subjects' estimates were less than the (subjective) 
expected value of the lotteries based on their subjective probabilities 
(indicating risk aversion) and greater than the (objective) expected 
value based on the computed probabilities (indicating risk seeking). 
These estimates were roughly proportionate to the subjective probabili-
ties. They were essentially unrelated to the decomposition. 
Discussion. Subjects' willingness to pay to play these lotteries 
was closely related to their estimates of success, suggesting that their 
probability estimates were relatively meaningful to them. On the aver-
age, they were quite risk averse, especially for the noncoherent sub-
jects (whose probabilities were higher than the overall averages in the 
table). 
Single-Event Probabilities 
Results. Subjects in the three groups that considered multiple 
spinners also judged the probabilities associated with 12 single-spin-
27 
The amounts subjects were willing to pay to play these single-event 
lotteries increased monotonically with their assessments of the likeli-
hood of winning them. Interpreting their absolute assessments literally 
shows a high degree of risk aversion. For all but the smallest probabi-
lities, subjects were willing to pay about one-quarter of the lotteries' 
expected value. 
Were all 12 single spinners to be spun, subjects in all three 
groups expected approximately four successes. This expectation is quite 
similar to the 3.6 successes obtained by adding the probabilities 
assigned to the individual events. Apparently, subjects had a better 
feeling for how these mediuI:1-range probabilities "added up" than they 
had for the smaller probabilities associated with the multiple-spinner 
events (where they overestimated the nunber of successes). On the other 
hand, subjects failed to reali7.e the extent to which these individually 
uncertain events provided a cumulative certainty of having at least one 
success. Their mean probability was 0.67, compared with the 0.996 
computed from their single-spinner assessments. 
Discussion. The orderliness of subjects' responses to the single-
stimuli events showed that they had little difficulty with the concepts 
of spinners, probabilities, or lotteries. The precision of their proba-
bility assessments suggests that single spinners may be an effective way 
of communicating probabilities (although not necessarily any more effec-
tive than simply giving numerical values). :'-1ost significantly, both 
coherent and noncoherent subjects were better able to assess the small 
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probabilities of unlikely events when those were presented as single 
events than as multiple events, even though this meant judging very 
small sectors of spinners. 
Creating Lotteries 
Results 
The top rows of Table 7 show the mean probabilities appearing on 
each of the spinners created by subjects instructed to produce the 
target probabilities at the top. The "fair" probabilities are the ones 
that they initially provided; the "attractive" ones were produced subse-
quently in response to the request to make the lottery seem more attrac-
tive, while holding its probability constant. 
With the fair lotteries, the probabilities assigned to the three 
spinners were quite similar, whereas with the attractive lottery, the 
initial spinner had a higher probability associated with it. Thus, in 
the aggregate, these subjects believed that other individuals' probabi-
lity assessments were anchored on the first spinner that they saw (so 
that making it more likely made the conjunction seem more likely). 
Consistent with this serial differentiation of the spinners, there was 
greater variance among the attract.ive sets. One measure of the variance 
is the range of the standard (z) scores associated with the three spin-
ners in a set. With 0.250 as a target probability, the means of these 
z-scores were 1.22 and 1.55 for fair and attractive sets, respectively. 
For the other target probabilities, the respective means were: 0.125 
(1.50, 1.78), 0.042 (1.74, 1.69), 0.015 (1.44, 1.69), 0.002 (0.91, 
1.13). For the three larger target probabilities, there was no tendency 
for attractiveness to be achieved by increasing the actual probability 
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of the event. With the two lower targets, the attractive version of 
each spinner had a higher probability than its fair counterpart. 11 
These differences between the fair and attractive probabilities 
were far outshadowed by the differences between each and the target 
probabilities that subjects were asked to create. The middle section of 
the table shows three measures of the conjoint probabilities associated 
with the subject-created spinners: (a) the arithmetic mean of the 
products of the three spinners produced by individual subjects, (b) the 
geometric mean of the products of individual subjects' spinners (which 
reduces the influence of subjects with extreme responses, (c) the pro-
duct of the mean probabilities associated with the spinners (as appear 
in the table above). By any measure, subjects created probabilities 
that were much too small. The bottom portion of the table shows the 
ratio of their created conjoint probabilities to the intended ones. 
These ratios are always greater than one and range up to enormous devia-
tions with the smallest target probabilities. 
Discussion 
Despite the difference in procedures, having subjects create 
lotteries revealed the same misunderstanding of conjoint probabilities 
as did having them just judge probabilities. In both conditions, they 
failed to realize just how unlikely the conjunction of a set of uncer-
tain events would be. Where comparisons are possible, even the magni-
tude of the bias is similar. Subjects in the other groups saw three 
spinners of 0.125 (target .002, Decamp A) and thought that they repre-
sented a conjoint probability of 0.08; 12 subjects here created three 
spinners with roughly those probabilities in order to produce (what they 
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thought was) a probability of 0.042. Subjects seeing three spinners of 
0.25 thought that their conjoint probability was 0.13; subjects created 
three spinners of roughly 0.2 in order to achieve a conjoint probability 
of 0.125. Subjects seeing three 0.50 spinners thought that they 
am.ounted to 0.34; subjects created three of approximately 0.40 to 
achieve 0.25. Moreover, these values are also similar to those observed 
in other studies. Cohen et al. (1971) found that subjects estimated the 
conjoint probability of three Q.5 events to be 0.30 (rather than 0.125) 
and the conjoint probability of three 0.25 events to be 0.11 (rather 
than 0.016). Bar-Hillel (1973) found a probability of 0.15 associated 
with three events of 0.25. 
Hazardous Wastes 
In most respects, responses to the two hazardous waste conditions 
were strikingly similar to one another. The absolute differences bet-
ween the mean values assigned by all subjects to the conjunctions were 
0.005, .004, and .019 for stimulus probabilities of .002, .016, and .125, 
respectively. There was no significant form effect for the conditions 
as a whole, or for either the coherent or noncoherent subsets. Nor was 
Condition involved in any significant interactions. Thus, there was no 
evidence of wishful thinking, or any related processes, evoked by consi-
dering the risks as personal rather than as the lot of an anonymous 
individual. Table 8 presents mean values for the pooled conditions. 
The corresponding ,~iOVAs show a significant effect for Probability. 
There was, however, no significant effect for Decomposition anywhere. 
Thus the tendency observed earlier for the no variance decomposition to 
elicit higher probabilities was absent here. 
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Insert Table 8 about here 
The pooled results here are fairly similar to those found in the 
corresponding bottom sections of Tables 3a-3c, pooling the results of 
all subjects viewing these stimuli in r::iore benign contexts. The 
percent-age of coherent and noncoherent subjects here are also within 
the ranges observed earlier, being 49.6% and 23.5%, respectively. 
Although these values are toward the high performance ends of those 
ranges, established by the basic group, they do not seem very impressive 
given the realism of the events involved and the weakness of the defini-
tion of coherence. 
In other respects as well, these subjects resembled their predeces-
sors, with the greatest similarities being to the basic group. The 
expected number of successes was higher for coherent subjects (3.49) 
than noncoherent ones (5.77), reflecting consistency with the general 
ordering of their probabilities although much above the actual expecta-
tion in both cases. Their estimates of the probability of at least one 
win also showed this differentiation and produced values akin to the 
higher performance end of the range observed above; the means were .446 
and .668 for the coherent and noncoherent groups, respectively. Thus, 
this concreti?.ation evoked no better performance than did the minimal 
context of the basic condition. 
Nixed Events -------
The 43 subjects who completed the mixed events forms provided a 
wide variety of events in the prescribed categories and with the pre-
scribed probabilities. Although the accuracy of these predictions might 
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be of interest for other purposes (e.g., Fischhoff & MacGregor, 1982), 
for present purposes all that matters is that they seem right to the 
individuals producing them. The procedure is being tested as a way to 
cor1municate very low probabilities per se, not the very low probabili-
ties of particular events. 
All in all, it was not very effective in that role. In 42.4% of 
their assessments, subjects assigned higher probabilities to the conjunc-
tion than to the least likely of the constituent events. Only 32.6% 
provided coherent responses to all four questions, whereas 37.2% were 
always noncoherent. These percentages are within the ranges observed with 
the previous conditions, and toward their low performance end. Violation 
levels were quite high for each of the four questions, with no clear 
relationship to the siz.e of the conjoint probability. Table 9 presents 
mean responses are presented for all these subjects along with means for 
all spinners subjects receiving either the same decomposition (C) or any 
decomposition. In this respect, too, the numbers are quite coraparable. 
As before, however, these overall means represent the responses of few 
individual subjects. Rather, they are the weighted means of subjects 
showing varying degrees of coherence who respond similarly and are present 
in similar proportions in all of these studies. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
All subjects completing the present forms had, earlier in the same 
experimental session, completed one of the hazardous waste forms. 
Across subjects, there was a correlation of .58 between the proportions 
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of noncoherent responses in the two conditions, indicating a consistent 
individual tendency to follow or violate the conjunction rule. 
General Discussion 
The predominant conclusion of these experiments is that many people 
have difficulty with the notion of conjunction, which emerges in group 
statistics as consistent exaggeration of the probability of conjunc-
tions. This occurs whether the events are described numerically or with 
graphic spinners, whether the events have no attendant consequences or 
are described as having significant consequences (either positive, a 
lottery, or negative, a health risk), whether the events occur simultan-
eously or sequentially, whether subjectively or objectively measured 
values are used for the constituent events, and whether the events are 
created by the experimenter or by the subject. In overall means, the 
magnitude of the overestimation varied from a factor of two for inter-
mediate probabilities to a factor of 10 to 100 for very small probabili-
ties. Even the magnitude of the bias was similar across conditions here 
and with results observed elsewhere. A complementary process is found 
in subjects' underestimation of the probability that at least one of the 
set of 12 uncertain events will occur, both for the single-stimulus and 
the multiple-stimulus events. This can be seen as overestimation of the 
probability of the conjunction of a series of 12 non-occurrences. 
At the individual subject level, fewer than a quarter of subjects 
passed the (seemingly minimal) coherence test of never giving a conjoint 
probability greater than the smallest single-event probability in a set. 
Although the level of coherence varied some across conditions, there was 
no clear trend. With the 12-event conditions, the highest levels were 
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observed with the basic and hazardous waste stimuli, which might be seen 
as most and least abstract, respectively. The correlation between the 
proportions of coherent responses among subjects who participated in 
both the hazardous wastes and the mixed events forms suggest that it may 
be more productive to see individual, rather than situational, corr-
elates of coherence. With the present seer:iingly straightforward ques-
tions and presentations, the rates were reasonably similar in all condi-
tions. Within each condition, secondary analysis revealed a consistent 
difference with regard to the one demographic variable available: the 
percentage of female subjects was always higher in the noncoherent 
subpopulation than in the coherent subpopulation. 13 As there is no 
reason to assume that the life experiences or thought processes of the 
sexes differ in this regard, a plausible attribution is that this dif-
ference reflects the relative ar:1ount of education in analytical subjects 
such as mathematics, physics, and engineering. Even if the conjunction 
rule itself is not taught, such training may facilitate discerning the 
logical structure of tasks, such as the nominal implication of the 
conjunction rule used here as a criterion of coherence. 
Anong the coherent subjects, there was a modest tendency with the 
spinners tasks to attribute higher probabilities to the no variance 
decompositions. Apparently, a concomitant of their general sophi.stica-
tion was a particular sensitivity to the presence of very small probabi-
1 . . . ( f d . h ' l · h · · 1 · ) 14 1t1.es 1.n a set as was .oun wit tne 11g er variance st1.mu 1 • 
Where there was variance in a set, the smallest probability stimulus was 
always presented first, an arrangement that the creating-lotteries sub-
jects seemed to believe would reduce its attractiveness. 
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The stakes associated with an event had no obvious effect on the 
probability assigned to it. The lack of a wishful thinking effect here 
might be contrasted with the common belief in its existence and its 
observation in correlational studies. The latter often show higher 
probabilities associated with oore favorable events. In correlational 
designs, however, it is difficult to disentangle biases in the recruit-
ment of information from biases in its interpretation. The present 
ambiguous stimuli provided identical information to all subjects, va-
rying only the consequences. It would be instructive to repeat this 
manipulation with real, rather than hypothetical stakes. 
Within this overall picture of problematic responses, there were 
also some signs of appropriate sensitivity. Subjects' probability 
assessments were strongly correlated with the presented values even if 
they different greatly from their absolute values. At least with the 
single-stimulus events, their estimates of the number of "successes" 
were consistent with their subjective probabilities. Similarly consis-
tent were the amounts that subjects were willing to pay to play these 
gambles (showing a general tendency toward risk aversion when evaluated 
in terms of subjective probabili.ties). Their probability assessments 
for the single-stimulus events were quite accurate, indicating that 
subjects had little difficulty with the concepts of simple probability, 
lotteries, and spinners. Whether such performance is reassuring or the 
least that one would expect from people able to survive in the modern 
world is a topic for discussion. 
In addition to the theoretical insight that they provide into judgmen-
tal processes, these results suggest one strong practical suggestion: 
37 
presenting low probability events as the conjunction of more likely events 
is not a good way to communicate information about them. It is preferable 
to find some way to represent the low probability itself. Where both 
conjunctions and summary probabilities are provided (e.g., Smith et al., 
1985), many subjects are likely to be surprised by the contrast between 
what they would expect the probabilities to be (given the constituent 
events) and what the presenter claims that they are. It is unclear whether 
recipients would respond to this contrast by rejecting one of the two 
values, by getting confused, or by achieving some deeper understanding of 
conjunction that allows them to reconcile the expected and presented 
values. Where the constituent events are drawn from subjects' lives (as 
was the case directly with the mixed events condition and as might be the 
case with the hazardous wastes stimuli), any misperception of those events 
probabilities would only complicate matters. In individual cases, the 
result might be countervailing biases. However, it would take a large act 
of faith to build on that hope. 
A more realistic hope is being able to add the conjunction rule to 
people's repetoire of statistical intuitions (e.g., Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson 
& Kunda, 1983). What would seem to be needed here is education that helps 
one to discern the logical (or statistical) structure of diverse situations 
(Beyth-Marom, Dekel, Gombo & Shaked, 1985). Attempts to achieve better 
performance without conferring some deeper understanding have not proven 
very successful (Fischhoff, 1982; Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel, 1984). Attempts 
to teach conjunction quickly in the course of presenting information about 
specific low probability events risk confusing people about the task at 
hand without effectively enabling them to cope with future tasks. 
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1. Candidate terms might be "disconsolate thinking," "depressive 
thinking," "wishless thinking," "hopeless thinking," and "dreadful 
thinking." 
2. The artificiality of the events in these studies suggests that 
this bias arises without the sort of rich, causal interpretation under-
lying the "conjunction fallacy" described by Tversky & Kahneman (1983). 
3. For the spinners groups, our standard of comparison for the 
probability of the least likely event was the measured area of the black 
sector on the spinners. In order to accommodate any problems arising 
from subjects' inability to estimate the area of sectors, estimates as 
much as 0.02 more than the smallest spinner's probability were not 
considered as violations. This is quite a lenient criterion, insofar as 
the other two spinners in each set always had probabilities that were 
obviously less than 1.0. 
1+. Within all three tables, there was a modest Form X Probability 
interaction, which reached significance in the coherent subject and 
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pooled results. It seems, in part, attributable to a restriction of the 
range of responses with the multiple-events form. Although this might 
suggest that the numerical presentation reduced the discriminability of 
the different probabilities, the effect and evidence are too weak to do 
more than raise that as a suggestion. For the pooled results, F = 2.84 
(df = 6,400; p < .Ol); for the coherent subjects, F = 2.99 (df 6,174; 
p < .01); for the noncoherent subjects, F = 1.65 (df = 6,104; p < .15). 
5. After being diluted by the absence of an effect among the 
noncoherent subjects (F = 2.37; df = 3,156; p > .OS), this emerged as a 
weakly significant effect in the pooled results (F = 3.65; df = 3,600; 
p < .02). Given the noisiness of these responses, no additional inter-
pretation seems appropriate. 
6. One possible interpretation (suggested by Lita Furby) of the 
decomposition effect with this group is that coherent subjects under-
stand the limiting role of the smallest probability in the set and use 
it as an anchor, adjusting their overall estimate downward to accommo-
date the two other events. As elsewhere (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), however, the adjustment process proves inadequate, leaving their 
final estimates too close to the anchor, whose value increases as the 
variance of the decomposition decreases. 
7. This result provides some small reason for pessimism regarding 
another possible approach to making small probabilities more comprehen-
sible, namely, representing them by the union of less likely events. 
Here, the whole is seen as nore likely than the sm1 of its parts. 
8. The mean correlation, using Fisher's z transformation, was 
0.116 across the four coherent subgroups and 0.273 across the noncoher-
40 
ent subgroups. 
9. Mean correlation for the four coherent subjects was 0.132; for 
the noncoherent groups it was 0.546, a value that was bouyed by 
inexplicably large correlations in two small groups (n = 8,12). 
10. Subjects in the basic group were also asked about their will-
ingness to pay to play the three-spinner events. However, these ques-
tions came after they had made probability judgments for the single 
spinners and many subjects seemed to have been confused regarding which 
set of 12 events they should be judging. Rather than attempt to discern 
which subjects were referring to which stimuli, their responses will be 
ignored. 
ll. Thus, although ANOVA yielded no overall Task (fair vs. attrac-
tive) effect, there was a significant (alpha= 0.005) Target Probability 
X Task interaction for the sum of the probabilities in Table 7, as well 
as for each measure of conjoint probability. 
12. This is the mean value for all subjects. It is bracketed by 
the 0.02 for coherent subjects and 0.17 for noncoherent ones. Analogous 
bracketing values 1:1ay be found for the other values cited in the text. 
13. Over all groups, women constituted 72.1% of the non-coherent 
subjects, com.pared with only 48.8% of the coherent ones (z = 3.77). 
14. See also Footnote 6. 
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Decomposition 
A (no variance) 
B (low variance) 
C (mid. var.) 





1 2 3 
.125 .125 .125 
(.375, 11) 
.1)41+ .210 .210 
(.464, 12) 
.044 .125 .354 
(.523, 8) 





1 2 3 
• 250 .250 .250 
(.750, 1) 
.125 .354 • 354 
(.837, 4) 
.125 .250 .500 
(.875, 7) 




1 2 3 
.500 .500 .500 
( 1. 50, 2) 
.354 .595 .595 
( 1. 54, 9) 
.354 .500 .707 
( 1. 56, 10) 
.250 .595 .841 
( 1. 69, 6) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the sum of the probabilities in 




Subjects Violating Conjunction Rule 
Different Numbers of Times 
Numl:,er of Violations 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 n 
--·~----·~--·- ·-·--·--~- ·- -~- --«·--~-·-· -··~-~·-----~·-----·-··- --~----,-·-----~--~--~- --~-----
basic 18 11 5 7 0 4 I '+ 2 1 2 2 2 4 62 
lottery 8 8 3 3 2 1 l 1 3 3 5 8 7 53 
sequential 
lottery 15 6 5 7 2 4 Ii 2 1 1 3 5 4 59 
multiple 
events 6 5 5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 3 11 36 
--,-··---·-- ·- ~--- ·----- -·~--··--·---,-------~--~~.-·-~ ~-----·---··- ··---·-·-·-·---------
total 47 30 18 18 5 10 10 5 5 6 12 18 26 21.0 
Group 
basic 
(N = 60) 
Lottery 
(N = 52) 
sequential 
lottery 
(N = 56) 
multiple 
events 
(N = 36) 
All 
(N = 20!+) 
Table 3a 
Mean Responses 
All subjects providing conplete responses 
























A B C D All 
080 050 048 063 060 
113 123 136 087 115 
313 306 303 252 293 
--- ------- ---- ---------------- -~---------
168 159 163 134 l 156 
088 075 094 088 086 
159 138 185 180 165 
---:::------:::------::: -----:::--1---:::---
069 064 065 058 I 064 
I 
112 123 12s 039 I 163 
322 308 442 250 ! 33!+ 
-----------------------------------~---------
168 167 210 133 l 169 
103 102 105 147 .1 114 
169 172 151 151 161 
3:35 275 266 256 l 283 
-----------------------------------,---------
202 1s3 114 1s5 I rn6 
083 069 015 os3 j on 
134 137 148 123 I 135 
341 313 31)0 274 l 322 ------------------------- _________ J ________ _ 




All coherent subjects providing complete responses 




B C D All 
basic 002 . 016 007 009 005 f 010 -
(N = 32) 016 060 030 048 018 I 039 
lottery 
(N = 19) 
sequential 
lottery 
(N = 24) 
multiple 
events 
(N = 16) 
all 
(N = 91) 

















015 005 008 009 f 009 













083 072 068 047 I 068 
g:: g;! g~i, g;~ r g;1 
---~~~------:~~------~~~------~~~--J---~~~---








027 I 015 039 






All noncoherent subjects providing complete responses 
(probability x 1000) 
target Deco~position 
Group probability A B C D All 
--------------------------------------- --------------------,----- ---
basic 002 187 186 247 345 l 241 
(N = 8) 016 249 439 461 333 I 371 
125 551 672 594 599 \ 604 
lottery 
(N = 20) 
sequential 
lottery 
(N = 12) 
multiple 
events 
(N = 16) 
All 











0 l. 6 
125 
-----------------------------------4---------
All 329 432 434 426 i 405 
! 
181 165 203 214 1 191 
226 214 316 380 I 289 
520 521 511 574 I 548 
All 
------------------ ----------------~---------
309 322 363 389 I 346 
' 
169 112 161 194 i' 157 
296 304 278 290 282 
All 
500 518 544 393 I 489 
-----------------------------------1---------
317 311 328 213 I 312 
! 168 110 118 290 I 202 
289 279 296 271 I 284 
All 
547 492 489 450 I 495 
------------------------------ ----~ -- -----
335 314 121 337 I 327 
174 158 193 260 r 194 
262 306 323 323 303 
528 536 5 !+ 5 503 i 528 ------------- ---------------------~---------
All 32i 333 354 359 342 
Tahle 4 
Mean Judgments for Compound Events 




















Expected Number of 
Successes 
Direct Computed p< 
3. 5 7 1 1.889 0.0001 
2. 7 6 7 0.831 0.0001 
6.250 4.861 ns 
3. 5 51 2.534 0.0001 
2.889 0.850 0.0001 
4.850 Li.151 ns 
3.093 1.996 0.0001 
2.348 0.751 0.0001 
3.727 3. 7 5 I ns 
3. 12 9 2.234 ns 
2. 14 3 0.621 ns 
4.000 3.900 ns 
Probability of at Least 
On,, Success 
Direct Cornputecl p< 
0.535 0.741 0.0001 
0.464 0.571 ns 
0.616 0.997 0.05 
0.351 0.717 0.0001 
().231 () , I: :i (, 0.05 
0.483 n.9/z 0.0001 
0.441} o. 785 0.0001 
0.278 0.527 U.001 
O.SL18 0.986 0.001 
0.523 0.835 0.0001 
0.379 0.592 0. 0 l 
0.703 0.992 0.0001 
·.:: =:::::: '.-::: = ''": = ·-:: :--.=,,:;:::: ::;;;:: ":;:: ~-~::;::::;: ;:.::: :::::: .;.:::: ;.;: ~.:: ;;..:; = = = = =:::;:::;:::;;:;:: ~ = =: = -::= ·= = ~...=:;;:: ~ ·- ::: :,;::; :·- =,;;:::...:: - -=. ~ "- ·-- ,..;:; ··- = - ... - - --: = -··~ = ;.::;: = 
t! ;_) t t2 : Co 111 p u t e d v a J u e s a r e de r i v e d f r om pr o ha h l l i t i e s 














computed subj ec.ti ve A B C 
0.002 0.086 0.76 0.63 0.99 
0.016 0.165 2.62 2.52 2.40 
0.125 0.391 ll. 62 5.60 7.01 
D All 




All 5.00 2. 92 3.47 3.57 2.54 
0.002 0.064 0.85 1.00 1.18 0.81 0.65 
0.016 0.163 2.23 2.09 2.13 1. 93 1.43 
0.125 0.334 7.68 6.20 6.13 4.58 4.17 
All 3.59 3.10 3.15 2.44 2.08 
0.002 0.116 4.43 4.38 3.02 4.02 2.66 
0.016 0.161 8.63 5.57 5.44 9.60 4.90 
0.125 0.283 15.92 10. 30 11. 71 9.39 7.95 
---------------- -----------------------------
All 9.66 6.75 6.72 7.67 5.17 









f~an Responses to Single-Event Stimuli 







Probability of Spinnera 
044 063 125 210 250 354 
6 8 5 4 9 10 
052 092 123 183 243 350 
067 082 128 188 237 333 






Willing ~ Pay i_hl 
Lottery • 12 .34 .67 l. 2 2.5 3.6 4.4 6.2 11 • 























------•-r---··----- ••• - - - -=--~-·-------- =--•~•- -···- ~-- ---~ - -~ ·-- ---·-·--u-• ~-· •- ·----~ - ·~ --- - - -=---·----·--~.-~,--~-·= -·~·--·-~•- -·- ·-
a Underlining indicates target probabilities in multiple-stimuli events. Of 




(probahilttt~s multiplied by 1000) 






merm of products 
~~E·.o•uetric. mean of products 















Ratio of Target to Created Probahilities 
mean of products 
geometric mean of products 
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Group 
All subject 
(N = ll5) 
Coherent 
(N = 57) 
Noncoherent 

















Hazardous Waste Forms--Pooled 




































































Consistency of Estimates for Subjects and Experimenter-Produced Conj11nctions 
-------~-=-:===~----==-~-===============-~=====-=======-===-======-~===-==----=-~ --------
Event 
l • 10 
2 .os 
3 .35 
4 • () 5 
Constituent 
Events 
• 25 .so 
• 10 .35 
.so .75 
• 3 5 • 7 5 




.002 • l:!. 8 
• 13 1 • 3 2 0 
















• 14 8 • 13 5 
.075 .077 
.360 .32) 
• 14 8 • 13 5 
Figure Caption 
1. Stimuli used for creating compound events. 

